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Abstract 
As the development of an implementation agreement on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction gathers 
pace, it is important to consider how this might impact upon international fisheries 
law.  Although the proposed agreement provides an opportunity to addresses 
governance gaps both generally and with respect to fisheries, we should not expect 
too much of it; not least because the inclusion per se of fisheries remains debated by 
States. Also, positive institutional developments are already occurring beyond this 
UN process. The proposed implementation agreement should not undermine existing 
laws, but it is unlikely to leave them untouched. The application of integrated 
governance principles, and the use of area-based management tools and 
environmental impact assessment will necessarily influence fisheries regulation in 
ABNJ.  Accordingly, care should be taken to ensure that any innovative governance 
tools are adapted to existing institutional capacities and circumstances. 
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Introduction1 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) establishes a broad 
framework for the regulation of our oceans.2  However, it is not complete.  One such 
gap concerns the regulation of marine resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(ABNJ). 3   States have resorted, inter alia, to the negotiation of ‘implementation 
agreements’ to fill gaps in or resolve problems with LOSC.4  Two such agreements 
have been adopted and now it is likely that a third will emerge to deal with ABNJ.5  
On 13 February 2015, the Ad-Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study                                                              
1 This paper was delivered first at a workshop organized by the K.G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the 
Sea at the University of Tromsø. My thanks to the Centre and colleagues at the workshop for their 
support, as well as Philomène Verlaan and David Freestone for their helpful feedback on the paper. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 
November 1994), 1833 UNTS 396. 
3 ABNJ refers to the high seas and the Area - the deep seabed beyond the outer limits of the continental 
shelf. 
4 On the development of the LOSC through a range of mechanisms, see generally, J Barrett and R 
Barnes (eds), Law of the Sea: LOSC as a Living Treaty (BIICL, London, 2016). 
5 1994 Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the LOSC of 10 December 1982 (New 
York, 28 July 1994, in force 28 July 1996), 1836 UNTS 42; The United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks (New York, 4 August 1995, in force force 11 December 2001) 2167 UNTS 88 
(Fish Stocks Agreement or FSA). 
issues related to the conservation and sustainable management of marine biological 
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction (BBNJ Working Group) concluded its 
work and recommended that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) initiate a 
process for the negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on the 
conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ.6 On 19 June 2016, the UNGA accepted 
this recommendation and initiated this process through the adoption of UNGA 
Resolution 69/292.7  This Resolution established a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
to make substantive recommendations on the elements of a draft legal text.  This was 
a significant step, the culmination of more than a decade of efforts focused on what is 
generally accepted to be a major gap in the scope of the LOSC8 It is for the UNGA 
decide whether to convene an intergovernmental conference to consider the 
recommendations of PrepCom, and elaborate the text of a legally binding instrument.  
This decision will be taken in 2018, and it is possible that a new agreement will be 
ready for adoption by 2020. 
Although States generally recognize the need for a global instrument on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ABNJ, this general 
consensus masks important differences of opinion on the precise scope and content of 
such an instrument, and of its relationship with existing arrangements.9  The process 
of developing a new agreement “should not undermine existing relevant legal 
instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies”.10 As 
this paper will show, this raised particularly difficult questions in respect of fisheries. 
Given that there is little agreement beyond the general topics to be covered in the 
proposed implementing agreement, one must be cautious about speculating too far on 
what future negotiations may bring.  However, one can be reasonably certain that the 
agreement will articulate some general principles concerning the conservation and use 
of marine biological resources.  It will also address the use of area-based management 
(ABM) tools, the use of environmental impact assessment (EIA) and mechanisms for 
capacity-building and technology transfer.  For the most part fisheries issues are likely 
to remain governed by existing instruments.  However, the scope of the proposed 
agreement means that fisheries will not be unaffected.  First, many of the governance 
principles proposed for the prospective ABNJ implementation agreement (ABNJ IA) 
are likely to influence or shape the future mandates of regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs), filling or addressing noted governance gaps. Second, two 
key elements of the proposed ABNJ IA, i.e., ABM and EIA, necessarily entail some 
degree of overlap with or accommodation of fishing activities.  
                                                             
6 Letter dated 13 February 2015 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad-Hoc Open-ended Informal Working 
Group to the President of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. 69/780, A/69/780, annex, section I. 
7 UNGA Res. 69/292, UN Doc. A/Res/69.292, 6 July 2015.  
8 On the governance gap see: K Gjerde, H Dotinga, S Hart, EJ Molenaar, R Rayfuse and R Warner, 
Regulatory and Governance Gaps in the International Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable 
Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, 2008); 
K Gjerde, ‘High Seas Fisheries Governance: Prospects and Challenges in the 21st Century’ in D Vidas 
and PJ Schei (eds) The World Ocean in Globalisation: Challenges and Responses (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2011), 99-113; D Freestone, ‘The Final Frontier: The Law of the Sea Convention 
and Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ in HN Scheiber and M-S Kwon (eds), Securing the Ocean for 
the Next Generation (Law of the Sea Institute, Berkeley, CA, 2012), 1-15; D Freestone, ‘Governance 
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: An Unfinished Agenda’ in Barrett and Barnes supra (n 4) 231-
265. 
9 This can be drawn from the discussions taking place within the BBNJ Working Group. See the Co-
Chairs’ summary of discussions in the Letter of 13 February 2016, supra (n 6), para 14.  
10 UNGA Res. 69/292, supra (n 7), para 3. 
This paper examines developments so far, focusing specifically on how they 
might affect fisheries regulation under international law.11  After outlining the context 
of the ABNJ IA, the paper reviews progress in the UN ABNJ process to date and 
examines the extent to which fisheries have featured in discussions.  Although the 
debates were not conclusive of how fisheries will be accommodated in the proposed 
ABNJ IA, some general trends can be detected.  This suggests that a broadly 
integrated approach, which builds on and is complementary to existing measures, will 
be preferred to radical approaches.  The paper then traces these discussions through 
the work of PrepCom 1. This is followed by an analysis of the potential contents of an 
ABNJ IA, focusing on those issues most likely to affect fisheries, i.e., governance 
principles, ABM and EIA. Within the ABNJ IA, the articulation and institutional 
support measures for governance principles will be absolutely critical. In the final 
section, the potential effects of this approach are assessed in existing fisheries 
regulation.  Here I suggest that there will need to be some adaptation of RFMOs (in 
terms of substantive principles, expanded remits), efforts outside the IA to close 
institutional and substantive gaps (new RFMOs), and more formalized mechanisms 
for institutional cooperation and decision-making. 
 
 
Context To The Proposed Implementing Agreement 
 
The LOSC and ABNJ 
The LOSC is a product of its time and so designed to deal with matters of which the 
negotiating States were then aware.   This did not include the issue of marine genetic 
resources (MGR), biological diversity or indeed many issues related to the 
governance of the marine environment of ABNJ.  Part XI of the LOSC was designed 
mainly to deal with mineral resources.  That said, many of the LOSC’s provisions 
were drafted in a way that would allow them to adapt to new situations.12 Despite this 
flexibility, the discovery of the existence of valuable marine resources with the 
potential to be exploited for their genetic potential, along with a growing awareness of 
the complex nature of deep sea ecosystems, has challenged the suitability of the 
LOSC as a self-contained regime for ABNJ. Much of this has focused on the tension 
between States holding to the applicability of the principles of freedom of the high 
seas and States advocating the application of the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind (CHM) to the resources constituting marine biological diversity.13 
 
                                                             
11 For a general review of developments, see R Long and M Chaves, ‘Anatomy of a new international 
instrument for marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. First impressions of the preparatory 
process’ (2015) 6 Environmental Liability 213-229. 
12 See for example, SV Scott, ‘The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans’ in AG 
Oude Elferink (ed), Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role of the LOS Convention 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 9-38; A Boyle, ‘Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of 
the Sea’ in D Freestone, R Barnes and D Ong (eds), Law of the Sea. Progress and Prospects (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 40-62; Barrett and Barnes, supra (n 4). 
13 This is widely discussed in the literature.  See for example, D Tladi, ‘Genetic Resources, Benefit 
Sharing, and the Law of the Sea: the Need for Clarity’ (2007) 13(3) Journal of International Maritime 
Law 183-193; AG Oude Elferink, ‘The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of 
the Common Heritage Principle and of Freedom of the High Seas’ (2007) 22(1) IJMCL 143-176. 
UN-led Consideration of Marine Biodiversity – The BBNJ Working Group 
In 2004, the UNGA established the BBNJ Working Group.14  The BBNJ Working 
Group would survey past and present activities of the UN and other 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), examine scientific, technical, economic, 
legal, environmental, socio-economic and other aspects of these issues.  This would 
provide the basis for more detailed studies by States of these issues, and ultimately 
lead to recommendations on how to improve cooperation and coordination.15  The 
BBNJ Working Group convened first in February 2006 and met periodically until it 
concluded its work in 2015.   
The outcomes of discussions are contained in a series of reports and letters to 
the President of the UNGA. 16   These summaries indicate the general trends in 
discussion and positions of delegates, either as groups or collectively, without 
specifying views of specific States.  It is interesting to note the careful use of 
language even in these reports, designed to generate consensus.  Thus a range of 
different terms is used to describe the views of delegations: ‘some’, ‘several’, ‘many’, 
‘other’ and so on. Additionally, there are references to singular positions (‘the view’ 
or ‘a view’) and indeterminate collective positions (‘delegations’ or ‘it’). The way in 
which the reports are composed tends to mask underlying ideological differences, but 
it definitely serves to build a sense of consensus.17  Unfortunately, it also makes it 
difficult to provide a detailed analysis of State positions. 
Little substantive progress was made at the first meeting in 2006, which 
focused on the organization of work and exchanges of views on the issues forming the 
remit of the BBNJ. There was a general consensus that the issues were important and 
concern for more effective implementation of existing legal commitments.18  It was 
accepted that whilst the LOSC is the framework for oceans activities, other 
instruments are also relevant.19  Fisheries were discussed, although no firm views 
were expressed, other than to note the potential harm, and that other fora were 
relevant to dealing with them. 20  Much of the subsequent BBNJ discussions are 
characterized by growing consensus on core issues, but divergent views remain on the 
institutional implications of this.   
 By 2008, key issues of common concern began to emerge, including capacity-
building, the implementation of effective EIA, and the development of ABM tools.21  
Consensus on these points continued to develop at the 2010 meeting, which 
highlighted the importance of expanding the knowledge basis for decision-making,22 
the general need for cooperation and coordination in implementation,23 and capacity-                                                             
14 UNGA Res. 59/24, 17 December 2004, UN Doc. A/Res/59/24, 4 February 2005. 
15 Ibid., at paras 73-4. 
16  Reports of the Ad-Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction: 
2006 – UN Doc. A/61/65, 20 March 2006; 2008 – UN Doc. A/63/79, 16 May 2008.  Letter from the 
Co-Chairpersons of the Ad-Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General 
Assembly: 2010 – UN Doc. A/65/68, 17 March 2010; 2011 – UN Doc. A/66/119, 30 June 2011; 2012 
– UN Doc. 67/95, 13 June 2012; 2013 UN Doc. A/68/399, 23 Sept 2013; 2014 – UN Doc. A/68/82, 5 
May 2014 and UN Doc. 69/117*, 23 July 2014; also footnote 9. 
17 This was manifest in the debate about whether or not MGR are part of the CHM regime.  See for 
example UN Doc. 69/117*, para 12. 
18 UN Doc. A/61/65, Annex I, paras 4 and 5. 
19 Ibid., at para 3. 
20 Ibid., at para 7. 
21 UN Doc. A/63/79, para 54. 
22 UN Doc. A/65/68, paras 31-37. 
23 Ibid., at paras 11-12 and 42-45. 
building24  There was also continued focus on ABM and EIA.25  The 2011 meeting of 
the BBNJ Working Group presented a series of recommendations to the UNGA. This 
reflected a growing consensus between groups of States on the scope of a negotiating 
package.26  Whilst it was generally accepted that the status quo was not an option, 
States were divided on the precise way forward.27  The BBNJ did not recommend an 
IA, but called for the initiation of a process that would address certain issues (general 
conservation and sustainable use of MGR in ABNJ, benefit-sharing, ABM, EIA, 
capacity-building and technology transfer), including through the development of an 
agreement under LOSC.28  UNGA Resolution 66/231 consolidated the mandate of the 
BBNJ Working Group in line with the above recommendations.29   
In 2012, the BBNJ Working Group met shortly before the Rio+20 Summit.  
By this stage it appears that a number of delegations were comfortable with the notion 
of an implementing agreement.  However, insufficient consensus remained on this 
point.  No decision on an implementing agreement was taken at Rio+20, although 
States made a strong commitment at a ministerial level to address this issue as a 
matter of urgency, and to reach a decision on the adoption of an agreement before the 
end of the UNGA’s 69th session in August 2015.30  This provided much-needed 
political momentum.  One may note that the rate of progress in BBNJ discussions 
improved from 2013, with the use of inter-sessional meetings, and an invitation to the 
Co-Chairs of the BBNJ Working Group to submit their views on the scope, 
parameters and feasibility of an IA under the LOSC.31  This latter point was built on 
in UNGA Resolution 68/70, which called upon States to submit their views on the 
scope, parameters, and feasibility of an IA.32 However, a lack of consensus remained 
on the precise scope of a negotiating package.33  Securing this was to become the 
main focus of the 2014 meetings.  The BBNJ Group met twice (1-4 April and 16-19 
June) in 2014. During the first meeting it was noted that the work of the BBNJ was 
reaching a critical stage, where decisions needed to be made.34  Thus discussions 
covered questions of form (soft law or binding agreement?), as well as potential 
substantive and procedural aspects of an instrument.35  Also, such matters should be 
addressed through an instrument falling under the LOSC.36 A preference for a binding 
instrument emerged.37  At the 2015 session, the recommendation to develop a legally 
binding instrument was taken. 
On 19 June 2016, the UNGA adopted UNGA Resolution 69/292,38 which put 
in motion the process for formally developing an IA. It established a PrepCom open                                                              
24 Ibid., at para 38. 
25 Ibid., at paras 14-18. 
26 See S Hodgson, A Serdy, I Payne and J Gille, Towards a Possible International Agreement on 
Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction. IP/A/ENVI/2014-04 (European 
Parliament, 2014) p. 50. 
27 UN Doc. A/66/119, paras 42-3. 
28 Ibid., at Annex, para 1. 
29 UNGA Res. 66/231, paras 167-8. 
30 See Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
20-22 June 2012) UN Doc. A/CONF.216/16, para 162. 
31 UN Doc. A/68/399, Annex, para 1(d) and (e). 
32 UNGA Res. 68/70, para 201. 
33 UN Doc. A/68/399, para 50. 
34 UN Doc. A/68/82, para 14. 
35 Ibid., at paras 31-48. UN Doc 69/117*, paras 23-81. 
36 UN Doc. A/69/177*, para 11. 
37 Ibid., at paras 13-16. 
38 UNGA Res. 69/292, supra (n 7).  
to all Member States of the UN, its specialized agencies and parties to the LOSC, and 
it was charged with making recommendations to the UNGA on the elements of a draft 
text of a binding agreement.39  Although States have driven this process, both IGOs 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided considerable input.40   
 
PrepCom’s First Meeting 
The progress made by BBNJ Working Group meant that the material scope of 
PrepCom’s mandate is quite clear. It is to address the following issues: “the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, in particular, together and as a whole, marine genetic resources, 
including questions on the sharing of benefits, measures such as area-based 
management tools, including marine protected areas, environmental impact 
assessments and capacity-building and the transfer of marine technology”.41   
PrepCom hosted its first meeting between 6-8 April 2016, with a second 
meeting scheduled between 26 August and 9 September 2016.42  The meeting was 
well attended, but was by no means universal, despite the aim of the UNGA to be as 
inclusive as possible through the participation of all States, IGOs and NGOs, not just 
States Parties to the LOSC.43  It was attended by 91 States Parties, 10 Non-States 
Parties, seven IGOs, five UN specialised agencies, five UN-funded programmes and 
agencies, 17 NGOs and two private commercial groups. 44 Notably only one RFMO, 
the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), attended, despite the 
importance of the ABNJ IA to fisheries.  PrepCom will report to the UNGA by the 
end of 2017, although this does not mean a draft text will be presented at this point. 
Rather, an intergovernmental conference will be convened at a date to be agreed 
before the end of the UNGA 72nd session (September 2017) to consider and elaborate 
the text of a binding agreement.   
PrepCom procedures are the same as those applicable to the UNGA, with 
participatory rights afforded to the European Union (EU) as per the LOSC’s Meetings 
of States Parties.45 In order to secure the widest possible agreement, PrepCom shall 
work, as far as possible, on the basis of consensus.46  Consensus has been facilitated 
through the use of informal working groups arranged on the basis of the four key 
aspects of the proposed agreement: Mr. Carlos Sobral Duarte (Brazil) - MGR, 
including benefit-sharing; Mr. John Adank (New Zealand) - ABM tools; Mr. René 
Lefeber (the Netherlands) - EIAs; and Ms. Rena Lee (Singapore) - capacity-building 
and the transfer of marine technology.  It seems, however, that securing a text is the 
priority, as allowance is made for the draft text presented to the UNGA to contain 
provisions where consensus is lacking.47                                                                
39 Ibid., at para 1(a). 
40 R Warner ‘Conserving marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction: co-evolution and 
interaction with the law of the sea’ in DR Rothwell, AG Oude Elferink, KN Scott and T Stephens 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015) 52–76. 
41 UNGA Res. 69/292, supra (n 7), para 2. 
42 There is no formal record of PrepCom discussions, other than the Chair’s overview of PrepCom’s 
first session.  Available at : 
 http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/PrepCom_1_Chair's_Overview.pdf.   
However, a daily report on the discussions was published in Earth Negotiations Bulletin: 
http://www.iisd.ca/oceans/bbnj/prepcom1/.  
43 UN General Assembly Res. 69/292 (2015), para 1(a). 
44 Long and Chaves, supra (n 11), at 220. 
45 Supra (n 43), at para 1(j). 
46 Ibid., at para 1(g)-(h). 
47 Supra (n 43), at para 1(i). 
The emphasis on integration at PrepCom is significant. It marks the continued 
faith in the success of package deal negotiations that underpinned the LOSC. More 
specifically, it would appear to fundamentally link questions of international fisheries 
regulation to the development of the IA.  As discussed below, this is perhaps the most 
challenging issue faced by PrepCom.  Indeed, the main divergence of opinion during 
the first meeting was the relationship between the new instrument and fisheries 
regulation.  It is to this question we turn now. 
 
Fisheries and Governance Issues at the BBNJ Working Group and 
PrepCom 
 
Fisheries and Governance Gaps 
High seas fisheries and RFMOS have been subject to a high degree of criticism, much 
of it noting the need for reform.48  Although fisheries regulation was not the principal 
object of the BBNJ Working Group’s mandate, it was no surprise to see many 
delegations raise this issue at the first BBNJ meeting in 2006.49  In later meetings, 
several fisheries-specific gaps were raised by delegates, including a lack of effective 
flag State control over fishing vessels operating in ABNJ, the need to improve port 
State control, limited regulatory tools (for example, scope for market-based controls 
on fisheries), weak performance reviews of RFMOs, gaps in the geographical and 
species coverage of RFMOS, and failure to implement controls on bottom-trawl 
fishing.50  Whilst such issues are important, the identification of regulatory gaps in 
fisheries management could have been more complete, and this might have served to 
reinforce calls to include fisheries within a new regime. For example, the FSA does 
not explicitly cover discrete high seas stocks, and some gaps exist in the coverage of 
such stocks by RFMOs.51  The FSA provides a framework for RFMOs and other 
arrangements, but it does not require conformity with its provisions. 52 Many but not 
all species are regulated by RFMOs.53 Geographic gaps in RFMO coverage include 
the Arctic, Central and Southwest Atlantic.54  Small vessels may be exempted from 
the FAO Compliance Agreement. 55   More generally, institutional oversight of                                                              
48 See the material cited in footnote 8. Also KM Gjerde, D Currie, K Wowk and K Sack , ‘Ocean in 
Peril: Reforming the Management of Global Ocean Living Resources in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’ (2013) 74(2) Marine Pollution Bulletin 540-551; A Cox, R Renwrantz and I Kelling, 
Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (OECD, Paris, 2009); MW Lodge, D 
Anderson, T Løbach, G Munro, K Sainsbury and A Willock, Recommended Best Practices for 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (Chatham House, London, 2007); AD Rogers and M 
Gianni, The Implementation of UNGA Resolutions 61/105 and 64/72 in the Management of Deep-Sea 
Fisheries on the High Seas (International Programme on the State of the Ocean, London, 2010); S 
Cullis-Suzuki and D Pauly, ‘Failing the High Seas: A Global Evaluation of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations’ (2010) 34(5) Marine Policy 1036-1042. 
49 UN Doc. A/61/65, paras 9 and 23. 
50 See, for example, UN Doc. A/63/79, paras 40 and 42; UN Doc. A/67/95, para 30; UN Doc. A/68/82, 
para 47. 
51 Y Takei, Filling Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries. Discreet High Seas Fish Stocks, Deep-sea 
Fisheries and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013) p. 4. 
52 See Gjerde et al, supra (n 8), at 9. 
53 Lodge et al, supra (n 48), xviii. 
54 For a general appraisal of RFMOs, see R Rayfuse, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ 
in Rothwell et al, supra (n 40) 439-462. 
55  Article II(2) of the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993 (Rome, 24 November 1993, in force 
24 April 2003), 2221 UNTS (No. 39486). 
RFMOs is lacking; no single institution is responsible for coordinating RFMO 
activities, or is independently mandated to review the performance of RFMOs, port 
States and flag States.  
Delegations expressed divergent views on fisheries issues, but one point of 
agreement was that poorly regulated fishing was the main threat to marine 
biodiversity in ABNJ.  At its first meeting in 2006, the BBNJ Working Group 
identified illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing 
practices as the greatest threat to ABNJ.56  Some delegations observed the existence 
of perverse incentives and profit from IUU fishing as one of the key drivers of harm.57  
However, whilst this point was not disputed, concern with the socio-economic drivers 
of IUU fishing does not seem to have featured in later BBNJ Working Group 
discussions.  In 2008, the Working Group focused on identifying anthropogenic 
impacts on BBNJ, and particular attention was placed on “unsustainable fishing 
activities, including overfishing, overcapacity, by-catch, destructive fishing practices, 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; non-participation and non-compliance 
with global and regional fisheries instruments’.58  Thereafter, these threats seem to 
have been accepted as a given, with subsequent discussions focusing on how to 
address knowledge gaps about the precise impacts of human activities on ABNJ.59  
These discussions in turn contributed to consensus on the need for any ABNJ regime 
to be underpinned by sound knowledge.  In this respect many delegates took the view 
that collection and sharing of data was critical to promoting conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity.60  At the 2012 meeting, it was noted 
that since the inception of the BBNJ process, pressures on marine resources had 
increased and that human activities, including overfishing, had continued to put the 
oceans at risk.61   In 2014, it was noted that “unsustainable fishing, in particular 
overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and certain destructive fishing 
practices, was the greatest threat to marine biodiversity in those areas”. 62   This 
presented States with something of a dilemma because if the subject-matter of an 
ABNJ agreement excluded fisheries, then how could it establish a workable regime 
for the conservation and sustainable use of ABNJ? 
In general, delegations were of the view that implementation could be 
enhanced by securing universal participation in the LOSC and other agreements.63  
This point is worth stressing, because the adoption of an ABNJ IA will not resolve the 
gaps in RFMO coverage.  This is something that depends upon the political will of 
States, as well as suitable socio-economic conditions.  This latter point may require 
some degree of support for developing States.  Already obligations of support, by way 
of capacity-building measures, exist under the FSA. 64   However, this would not 
necessarily result in all gaps being closed, particularly those that cut across different 
sectors.  To this end several delegations also raised the issue of how existing 
institutions could develop and adopt initiatives, guidelines and regulations within 
existing mandates.65                                                              
56 Ibid., at para 33, and Annex I, paras 7-8. 
57 Ibid., at para 37. 
58 UN Doc. A/63/79, para 13. 
59 See for example: UN Doc. A/61/65, paras 19, 45 and 45; UN Doc. A/68/399, para 33. 
60 UN Doc. A/65/68, para 34; UN Doc. A/68/399, para 33. 
61 UN Doc. A/67/95, para 14. 
62 UN Doc. A/68/82, para 10. Also UN Doc. 69/117*, para 8. 
63 UN Doc. A/65/68, para 43. 
64 See FSA, supra (n 5), Art. 25. 
65 UN Doc. A/67/95, para 40. 
Unfortunately, the question of how to address governance gaps in fisheries 
provoked quite polarized views during the BBNJ discussions. Some delegations took 
the view that a lack of political will to implement existing instruments would not be 
resolved by a new international instrument.66  Some delegations adopted the position 
that the FSA and other fisheries instruments and RFMOs were the appropriate means 
for dealing with fisheries matters.67  Others doubted that RFMOs had the capability or 
competence to deal with all fisheries issues in ABNJ because they lacked a holistic 
approach/capacity, had either a single-species mandate, or lacked mechanisms for 
dealing with non-fisheries issues such as vulnerable ecosystems.68  Given the noted 
existence of regulatory gaps, as opposed to implementation issues, other delegations 
appeared to support the inclusion of fisheries within subsequent measures for ABNJ.69  
Some delegations observed that there was a need for new RFMOs to close geographic 
gaps and for existing RFMOs to have their mandate strengthened.70 Amidst these 
uncertainties and divergence of opinions, one thing did seem clear: a lack of will to 
expand the competence of RFMOs beyond fisheries matters.71  More generally, the 
Co-Chairs’ Report and Summary specifically raised the importance of identifying 
gaps, with the aim of securing an effective legal framework.72  This was not limited to 
‘legal’ gaps, but included issues of participation and implementation.73  This left 
matters open on how best to progress, including on key issues related to fisheries. 
During PrepCom, the tension between delegations favoring either the 
inclusion or exclusion of fisheries re-emerged. Indeed, this was probably the 
dominant feature of discussions. On the one hand, Iceland, Japan, and the Russian 
Federation were quite robust in their view that fisheries were not to be included 
within an international legally binding instrument on ABNJ.74  On the other hand, a 
larger number of delegations or groups (the African Group, Costa Rica, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, and the USA) issued statements favoring the 
inclusion of fisheries.75  This appears to indicate a change in position by some States 
from that adopted at the BBNJ Working Group who were originally equivocal about 
the inclusion of fisheries.  Whether or not this trend continues will become clearer at 
subsequent meetings. The IUCN favored inclusion, and this seems implicit in the 
views of Greenpeace, the High Seas Alliance, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
and Pew, who advocated a comprehensive binding instrument. 76  It is likely that 
RFMOs will have more prominence at the August/September 2016 meeting, and with 
greater clarity on the position of RFMOs, it is expected that more States will clarify 
their position on the inclusion of fisheries in the ABNJ IA. 
 Given that States appear to have accepted that the proposed ABNJ IA should 
address governance gaps, there appear to be two realistic options for going forward. 
The first is to consider collaborative institutional mechanisms to integrate fisheries 
with other environmental and resource-related activities.  The second is to advance a                                                              
66 UN Doc. A/68/82, paras 47 and 73. 
67 UN Doc. A/61/65, para 24; UN Doc. A/65/68, para 44. 
68 UN Doc. A/61/65, para 25. 
69 UN Doc. A/69/82, para 47. 
70 UN Doc. A/66/119, para 55. 
71 UN Doc. A/63/79, para 24. 
72 UN Doc A/67/95, Annex, paras 29-47. 
73 Ibid., at para 31 
74 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, (2016) vol. 25/97, pp. 1-2 and Earth Negotiations Bulletin, (2016) vol. 
25/98, p. 2. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
set of cross-cutting governance principles that can promote substantive integration by 
shaping the conduct of States, RFMOs and other institutions with mandates in ABNJ.  
It is possible that either approach or some combination of the two could be 
accommodated within the proposed ABNJ IA.  These positions are considered in turn. 
 
Integrated Approaches to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biological Diversity 
The need for greater integration between different sectoral activities is generally 
recognized, but remains a significant challenge in a decentralized legal system.77 
From the outset, delegations to the BBNJ Working Group attached importance to 
enhanced cooperation in respect of ABNJ via existing mechanisms, including through 
RFMOs, and between RFMOs and regional arrangements for the protection of the 
marine environment.78  This was reiterated in the recommendations of the BBNJ to 
the UNGA in 2010, which called upon States and competent international 
organizations to cooperate as appropriate through regional seas conventions and 
RFMOs.79 The importance of integration was highlighted by some delegations in 
201180 and 2012.81  It is notable that some delegations called for a coordinated cross-
sectoral approach which would take into account the cumulative impact of human 
activities in ABNJ. 82  It is precisely this potential for cumulative impacts from 
different sectoral activities that provides a strong justification for integrated 
management, and is discussed further below.   
Once the idea of a legally binding instrument started to gain traction at the 
BBNJ meetings, discussions tended to focus on the relationship between a new 
agreement and existing fisheries agreements.  This manifested itself in discussions 
about ‘complementarity’ – the idea that existing mandates are not infringed, nor 
existing efforts duplicated.83  However, beyond this, the records reveal little about 
how this idea could be accomplished.  It is suggested that this could be achieved 
through the inclusion of a carefully drafted ‘conflicts clause’ in an IA.84 Alternatively 
it could be secured through a treaty provision that requires compatibility of 
approaches, similar to Article 4 of the FSA. 85 Ideally both provisions should be 
utilized because this would help drive collaboration and sharing of practices across 
different institutions and sectors.  One delegation did suggest that an IA should be 
limited to areas that were not covered by existing institutions.86  However, it was not 
clear whether this referred to geographic areas or substantive issues or both.  
Regardless of which approach was intended, such an ad hoc approach to gap-filling                                                              
77 See R Rayfuse and R Warner, ‘Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans beyond National 
Jurisdiction: The Legal Basis for an Integrated Cross Sectoral Regime for High Seas Governance for 
the 21st Century’ (2008) 23(3) IJMCL 399-421, at 413; K Scott, ‘Integrated Oceans Management. A 
New Frontier in Marine Environmental Protection’ in Rothwell et al, supra (n 40), 463-490; J 
Harrison, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention Institutions’, in Rothwell et al, supra (n 40), 373-394. 
78 UN Doc. A/63/79, para 24. 
79 UN Doc. A/65/68, para 12. 
80 UN Doc. A/66/119, para 14. 
81 UN Doc. A/67/95, para 13. 
82 UN Doc. A/66/119, para 14. 
83 UN Doc. A/67/95, para 29; UN Doc. A/68/82, para 41.  Also, UNGA Res. 69/292 (n 10). 
84  See Art. 311 of the LOSC. This is governed under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 1969 (Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980), 1155 UNTS 331.  See further O 
Corten and P Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011), vol. 1, p. 764. 
85 See UN Doc. 69/117*, para 31. 
86 UN Doc. 69/117*, para 19. 
should be avoided because it would result in unnecessary complexity and 
fragmentation. 
As noted above, an integrated approach was part of PrepCom’s mandate.87  
All participants supported this, either explicitly through the language of cooperation, 
or through calls to respect existing institutions and mandates.  During the discussions, 
the general principle of integration quickly manifested itself in specific contexts, such 
as calls for cumulative EIA and inclusive approaches to ABM. For example, the 
African Group noted that an integrated approach to the creation of marine protected 
areas (MPAs) cannot be advanced through RFMOs, presumably due to their limited 
mandates.88  Jamaica called for a binding instrument to adopt an integrated approach 
inclusive of fisheries.89   Given the prevailing consensus for cross-cutting integrated 
approaches, something that cannot be ignored if the ABNJ incorporates provisions on 
ABM and EIA, the question is how best to secure this. 
Arguably, several options for integration exist.90  The archetypes are mapped 
out in Figure 1.   
Figure 1: Scenarios and characteristics of institutional arrangements for ABNJ 
 
A1 - This would involve the creation of a new supra-national institution responsible 
for the management of all activities in ABNJ, including deep seabed mining, deep and 
high seas fisheries, marine scientific research, tourism, and environmental protection.   
It may be likened to an International Seabed Authority (ISA) + option, with defined 
institutional structures, governance principles, and decision-making authority and                                                              
87 UNGA Res. 69/292 Supra (n7). 
88 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, (2016) vol. 25/102, p. 1. 
89 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, (2016) vol. 25/98, p. 2. 
90 See also: IUCN, An International Instrument on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in 
Marine Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction. Matrix of Suggestions (IUCN, Gland, 2016), section 6. 
Available at http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_bbnj_matrix_december_2015.pdf  
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B1 Composite Regional ABNJ 
Management Organizations 
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institutional arrangements 
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A2 ABNJ Advisory Body/Process 
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B2 Coordinated Sectoral 
Management Organizations 
• ‘Enhanced status quo’. 
• Retain regional bodies, subject to 
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framework instrument. 
Weak Integration 
associated compliance mechanisms.  Through such processes the body (as opposed to 
individual States, or regional arrangements) would be responsible for adopting a 
management plan for ABNJ, identifying specific regulatory options and securing their 
implementation. 
 
A2 – This perhaps reflects the status quo.  Different sectoral bodies retain their 
discrete functions and consider ABNJ only peripherally.  Centralized consideration of 
ABNJ is left to informal UN processes centered on the UNGA, which continues to 
issue or commission guidelines on specific activities.  These guidelines may be 
followed by States or other institutions at their discretion.  
 
B1 – Fully integrated regional marine management organizations are established to 
regulate deep seabed mining, deep and high seas fisheries, marine scientific research, 
tourism, environmental protection.  These could be based on the existing regional 
arrangements for different ocean areas (e.g., NE Atlantic, NW Atlantic and so on), 
with their geographic mandate extended and coordinated to cover all ABNJ.  They 
would be authorized to use a system of marine spatial planning and associated tools to 
regulate all activities within the region. 
 
B2 – Existing bodies retain their sectoral mandates, but extend their sectoral remits to 
ABNJ to ensure gaps are filled.  They are mandated/encouraged to coordinate their 
sectoral activities through ad-hoc interactions based upon a set of governance 
principles and specific management tools. 
 
The discussions at the BBNJ and PrepCom are at too early a stage to reveal 
States’ clear preferences for one or the other approach.  However, delegations were 
alert to the consequences of both approaches, and it is possible to gauge the direction 
of change from reports of the BBNJ Working Group and PrepCom.  As noted above, 
a strong/holistic approach has significant implications for the structure and 
functioning of existing sectoral arrangements for fisheries. This also holds true for 
pollution control regimes, such as MARPOL and regional seas arrangements.  This 
approach would require profound institutional reform – something that States appear 
to be set against.  A decentralised approach is more realistic, and it would ensure that 
existing approaches are preserved.  However, it leaves many questions unanswered 
about how fisheries should be integrated within any future regime.  Integration could 
be secured through procedures to ensure that relevant interests, concerns, standards 
and approaches are taken into account within different agencies.  Already this is 
occurring outside of the UN processes.  A good example is the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the NE Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and 
the OSPAR Commission adopted in September 2008, which recognizes respective 
competences and areas of shared concern, and establishes processes for sharing of 
information, joint discussions and common approaches to the application of 
precautionary approaches and ABM.91  There is little reason why such an approach to 
information-sharing and advisory input could not form part of other joint initiatives 
between different sectoral institutions.92  This approach has the advantage of organic,                                                              
91 A similar agreement was agreed between OSPAR and other institutions: the International Seabed 
Authority (2011) and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (2013).  A collaborative 
arrangement was also adopted between OSPAR and the Sargasso Sea Alliance in 2012.  These are 
available at http://www.ospar.org/about/international-cooperation/memoranda-of-understanding.  
92 UN Doc. A/65/68, para 34. 
adaptive development and could generate stronger traction than a heavy-handed, top-
down approach.  To an extent, the proposed implementation regime is a default 
regime – one designed to tackle matters left unresolved by other instruments.  As such 
the pathway is already set against more radical reform of ABNJ governance.  Taking 
a purely fisheries perspective, it should be recalled that existing fisheries 
arrangements are not only concerned with the conduct of fisheries activities, but also 
about entitlement to obtain access to resources.  It is critical that States within RFMOs 
and regional arrangements have relatively stable access to and control over fisheries, 
and they are unlikely to risk compromising such entitlements.  Whilst States may be 
willing to accept wider governance responsibilities for fisheries in ABNJ, it is 
difficult to imagine that they would explode existing access arrangements to do this. 
 
 
Governance Principles for ABNJ and Fisheries  
The second approach to addressing governance gaps is to advance a holistic set of 
governance principles for ABNJ.  Already some fruitful discussion of such principles 
has occurred,93 and during the BBNJ discussions, a high degree of consensus on such 
principles appeared to prevail.94 The report of the 2014 BBNJ meeting compiled a list 
of these principles, including: balance between competing uses of the oceans and 
between conservation and sustainable use; protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, equitable utilization; cooperation; precautionary approach; decision-
making based on best available science; ecosystem approach; integrated approach; 
adaptive management; public participation in decision-making processes; 
involvement of regional and sectoral stakeholders; open and transparent processes; 
public availability of information; CHM;  freedom of the high seas; common but 
differentiated responsibilities;  special requirements of developing countries, 
including landlocked States; duty not to transfer damage or hazards or transform one 
type of pollution into another; polluter-pays principle; cumulative impacts; flexibility 
and ability to address cumulative pressures; solidarity; and flag State jurisdiction as a 
basis for enforcement on the high seas.  This list comprises a mix of established legal 
principles (e.g., precautionary principle) and other ideas, approaches, rules and 
attributes (e.g., solidarity, cumulative impacts and adaptive management).  It is also 
clear that there is potential overlap/repetition of principles, so some degree of 
rationalization will be necessary as the discussions advance. 
It is quite likely that some of these principles/approaches will form a 
substantive part of the proposed instrument, perhaps in a manner similar to Article 5 
of the FSA.  This is important because this will likely require existing RFMOs with 
an ABNJ mandate to respect such principles when adopting conservation and 
management measures.  It may even require amendment of constituent instruments 
where existing mandates are too restrictive or ambiguous. To help indicate the extent 
to which such principles will affect existing RFMOs, Table 1 below shows the extent 
to which a number of key principles are found within the constituent instruments of 
Regional Fisheries Bodies (RFBs) and the FSA.95                                                              
93 See the Chair’s summary, supra (n 42).  More generally, see the articles by D Freestone, AG Oude 
Elferink and RA Barnes in the special issue of (2012) 27(2) IJMCL. 
94 See the Informal Co-Chairs’ overview of issues raised during the first round of discussions on the 
scope, parameters and feasibility of an international instrument under the LOSC.  Appendix, UN Doc. 
A/69/82, 4 May 2014. 
95  RFBs includes both advisory bodies and those competent to adopt binding conservation and 
management measures. The table includes: Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission (APFIC), Commission 
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Table 1. Matrix of ABNJ Governance Principles in Regional Fisheries Bodies 
 
As the table indicates, the main gaps are in respect of cross-sectoral integration, 
transparent decision-making, and obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment and biodiversity. Such gaps tend to arise in respect of RFMOs 
established before the FSA in 1995.  The table only encompasses the constituent 
agreements of the various bodies, and some RFMOs have advanced these 
principles/approaches through management decisions. For example, ICCAT adopted a 
precautionary approach to the implementation of conservation and management 
measures in 2015, 96  and NAFO adopted a precautionary approach framework in 
2004. 97   However, this falls someway short of a systematic approach to the 
governance of ABNJ. 
A more detailed analysis of these provisions reveals qualitative variations in 
the way core principles are used in RFBs.  Some instruments refer to integrated 
approaches, but this is generally quite weak and limited to exhortations to cooperate 
with other interested organizations. 98  Even within the FSA, such cross-sectoral 
cooperation seems to be limited to provisions on developing States.99 In contrast, as 
noted above, OSPAR has developed links with NEFAC.  Also, a MOU has been 
adopted between WCPFC and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental 
Forum.100  It goes beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this in detail, but it may 
be noted that the relationships are complex, and often undermined by lack of 
experience and institutional capacity on both sides.101 
For example, APFIC refers to prevention of pollution, but only insofar as it 
affects resources, and this falls some way short of a general commitment to protection 
of the environment.102  In contrast, NAFO is quite detailed in referring to the actual 
environmental impacts of fishing.103  In some it is difficult to determine whether an 
approach or principle is included. For example, in the WCPFC an ecosystem-based 
approach might be implicit from the Preamble and Articles 5(d), 12(2)(c), and 13(3), 
but it is not mentioned directly.104  All RFBs refer to the use of science and data, but 
some do not refer to the use of best available science.105 Although most instruments 
refer to some form of stock assessment process, this falls some way short of best 
practices used in EIAs, and often does not consider the impact of fishing on the wider 
                                                             
96 ICCAT Resolution 15/12 Concerning the Use of a Precautionary Approach in Implementing ICCAT 
Conservation and Management Measures. https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-
e/2015-12-e.pdf.  
97 NAFO/FC Doc. 04/18. Available at http://archive.nafo.int/open/fc/2004/fcdoc04-18.pdf 
98 See for example, WECAFC, SPRFMO and SIOFA. CCAMLR is perhaps strongest in this respect, 
given that it is linked to the broader Antarctic treaty system.  
99 FSA, supra (n 5), Art. 24. 
100  WCPFC Cooperates with the SPREP via a MOU: https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC-
SPREP%20Memorandum%20of%20Understanding.pdf. 
101 See generally, UNEP, Regional Oceans Governance Making Regional Seas Programmes, Regional 
Fishery Bodies and Large Marine Ecosystem Mechanisms Work Better Together (UNEP, Nairobi, 
2016). 
102  Agreement for the Establishment of the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission 19486 (Baguio, 
formulated 26 February 1948, Approved Washington 15-29 November 1948, in force 9 November 
1948), 1615 UNTS 59), as amended 1996, Art. IV(b)(3). Most recent version available at 
http://www.fao.org/apfic/background/apfic-agreement/en/  
103  See Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 1978 
(Ottawa, adopted, 24 October 1978, in force 1 January 1979), as amended in 2007, Art. III(i). Most 
recent text available at http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/convention.html  
104 Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean 2000 (Honolulu, 5 September 2000, in force 19 June 2004). Available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-conservation-and-management-highly-migratory-fish-stocks-
western-and-central-pacific  
105 See IATTC, NPFC, SPRFMO, WCPFC, and WECFC. 
environment.106 Transparency of decision-making and availability of information also 
vary qualitatively.107 Indeed, IUCN has noted that 10 out of 13 RFMOs made no open 
access to primary data available.108 This is despite Article 12 of the FSA requiring 
transparency in decision-making and ‘other activities’. Only a few RFMBs explicitly 
adopt strong guarantees of transparent decision-making. 109  Similarly, whilst most 
RFMBs support the dissemination of information and decisions, few indicate that this 
will be done publicly. Often key information on enforcement and compliance is 
unreported, undermining compliance culture within RFMOs. 110   Others include 
caveats about confidentiality. 111  Arguably this falls short of best practice, for 
example, as included within the Aarhus Convention.112 Despite being a euro-centric 
regime, little percolation of requirements of openness and transparency into other 
RFMOs in which European States and the EU participate appears to have occurred.113 
References to sustainable use of resources are common.  However, few references to 
equitable sharing of resources exist.114  SIOFA is perhaps an exception, in that it 
refers to the special position of small island and other developing States. Whilst 
debates have taken place about the application of the CHM principle to MGR, it 
cannot be conceived that this would have any direct influence on fisheries.  There is 
no such reference to this in any fisheries instrument and no State is advancing this 
view.  That said, it is possible that an IA with provisions on benefit-sharing and 
capacity-building might influence some RFMOs to adopt more ‘equitable’ 
arrangements for access to fisheries.  The way in which the principles are articulated 
varies considerably.  
In general, the extent to which principles are found in agreements depends on 
a range of factors.  Thus post-1995 agreements (including those amended since 1995) 
have tended to a stronger and more complete statement of principles as per the FSA.  
It is unsurprising that RFMOs, as opposed to advisory bodies, have stronger 
provisions on the use of science, data exchange, and co-operation.  Several of these 
principles/approaches exist under general international law, and therefore apply to 
activities within ABNJ regardless of their inclusion within an RFMO constituent 
agreement.  However, their inclusion would have symbolic value and arguably 
increase pressure on States and other RFMOs to implement measures consistent with 
these principles.  Finally, this short review focuses on the constituent instruments.  In                                                              
106 See the evaluation of ecological risk assessment conducted by the IUCN: E Gilman, K Passfield and 
K Nakamura, Performance Assessment of Bycatch and Discards Governance by Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (IUCN, Gland, 2012), section 4.3. 
107 See T McDorman, ‘Implementing Existing Tools: Turning Words into Action – Decision-Making 
Processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (2005) 20(3) IJMCL 423-457, at 428. 
108 Supra (n 106), section 4.2. 
109 I.e., CECAF, ICCAT and IOTC. 
110 Supra (n 106), section 4.5. 
111 See for example, Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the 
South East Atlantic Ocean 2001 (Windhoek, 20 April 2001, in force 13 April 2003), 2221 UNTS 189, 
Art. 6(3)(l). Available at http://www.seafo.org/About/Convention-Text 
112 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matter 1998 (Aarhus, 25 June 1998, in force 30 October 2001), 2161 UNTS 447. 
113 The EU is a member of six tuna/highly migratory species RFMOs (AIDCP, CCSBT, IATTC, 
ICCAT, IOTC, and WCPFC) and 11 mixed RFBs (CCAMLR, Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea (CCBSP), CECAF, GFCM, NAFO, North 
Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO), NEAFC, SEAFO, SIOFA, SPRFMO and 
WECAFC). 
114 See the fifth recital of the preamble to the Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean 2009 (Auckland, 14 November 2009, in force 
24 August 2012). Available at http://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Basic-Documents/Convention-web.pdf 
recent years several RFMOs have started to adopt formal cross-sectoral mechanisms, 
not just with other fisheries bodies, but also with institutions responsible for 
environmental issues.115  This may establish pathways leading to more sophisticated 
management mechanisms, such as ABM and comprehensive EIAs. 
 
Fisheries and ABM 
 
ABM is a collective term referring to a range of spatially determinate measures 
designed to prevent harm to the environment, conserve resources and/or coordinate 
activities. From the outset, there has been consensus that ABM tools, including a 
network of MPAs and associated fisheries measures, are important tools for 
conserving and managing marine biodiversity in ABNJ.116  Initially, there appeared to 
be general support by States for addressing fisheries within ABM regimes.117  Already 
several RFMOs (and other institutions: ISA, International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)) adopt some form of ABM, so the question is really about whether this 
requires better coordination of these or entirely new mechanisms.118  However, the 
2006 BBNJ meeting was silent on both the legal basis of and institutional support for 
ABM. Delegations have since adopted quite different positions on this.  When this 
issue was raised in 2008, some delegations noted that a more comprehensive and 
integrated approach than currently existed was required.119  Some delegations have 
noted that measures to protect spawning stocks or to establish catch or fishing limits 
for specific areas are a form of ABM.120  Other delegations argued that progress 
needed to be made within existing arrangements, including RFMOS.121 In 2010, other 
delegations noted that existing RFMOs and arrangements have a mandate to 
implement ABM tools, such as MPAs, both in relation to particular stocks and the 
effects of fishing activities on vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas.122  
Reference was made to the MOU between NEAFC and OSPAR as an example of 
how existing institutions could cooperate in developing ABM tools.123  
In 2012, questions remained about the scope of MPA: what activities would be 
allowed therein, such as fisheries, and what role should existing institutions, such as 
RFMOs, have as regards MPAs.124  By 2014, it appeared that the issue was becoming 
polarized: was a new global instrument required to secure effective ABM, or could 
this be achieved through existing regional and sectoral regimes?  Noting the absence 
of any global regime for MPAs, one suggestion was to develop a regional framework 
for the designation and implementation of MPAs, following the RFMO/FSA 
model.125  However, it was not clear whether this would be done through ad hoc 
arrangements or a coordinating instrument. As regional cooperation may be easier to 
secure than global agreement, and would allow for regional circumstances to be taken                                                              
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into account, one can see the attraction of this approach.  However, one must also 
consider that regional fisheries are predominantly concerned with areas within 
national jurisdiction and they as yet do not provided complete geographic coverage.  
Discussions at the second meeting of the BBNJ in 2014 are revealing as to the 
complexities of designating and managing ABM regimes in ABNJ. First, it was 
generally agreed that although existing mechanisms exist for ABM, these are neither 
plenary in scope, or fully developed and readily applicable to ABNJ.126  Second, in 
ABNJ, the principal form of jurisdiction is by the flag State, and this means that the 
effectiveness of ABM is contingent on widespread global support.127  This is precisely 
the same challenge facing existing RFMOs and one that any new regime will need to 
address.    
It is not clear that significant progress was made at PrepCom on the 
relationship between fisheries and ABM.  At a bare minimum, all States seemed to 
agree that some degree of coordination is required between an instrument containing 
ABM provisions and existing fisheries regimes.  Several delegations suggested that 
the development of ABM should draw upon or involve RFMOS.128  The African 
Group rightly emphasized that RFMOs cannot adopt an integrated approach to MPAs 
– this requires, at a minimum, coordination of efforts.129 New Zealand and the US 
support inclusion of fisheries in a legally binding instrument.130  However, there 
seemed to be little appetite for a significant revision of RFMO mandates. Norway 
noted the cost-effectiveness of relying on existing mechanisms, such as RFMOs to 
establish MPAs.131 New Zealand proposed setting criteria for ABM tools that could 
be used by RFMOs.132  This approach has could be effective, having been relatively 
successful with regard to the FSA, which influenced the standards and mandates of 
pre-existing RFMOs, as well as newly established RFMOs.133  Furthermore, Norway 
noted the cost-effectiveness of relying on existing mechanisms, such as RFMOs to 
establish MPAs.134 Following calls from Iceland, Japan and the Russian Federation to 
hear from RFMOS, it seems likely that RFMOs will be more actively engaged in 
subsequent meetings of PrepCom.135 
If the proposed ABNJ IA is to include provisions onABM, then this should be 
done consistently with existing legal instruments providing for ABM.136  The LOSC,                                                              
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the FSA and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries contain a limited 
range of provisions relevant to ABM,137 but these are only obligations of a general 
nature, falling someway short of stronger ABM exemplified by, for example, the EU 
Habitats Directives or Maritime Spatial Planning regimes.138  The most important 
agreement is the Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8 of which encourages 
Contracting Parties to establish a system of protected areas as part of their 
commitments to ‘in situ’ conservation of biodiversity.139  As appropriate, guidelines 
should be adopted for the selection, establishment and management of such areas, 
along with regulatory or management measures.  These general commitments were 
further developed through the Programme of Work on Marine and Coastal 
Biodiversity. 140   Such policy measures are principally focused on areas within 
national jurisdiction, although the Programme highlighted the importance of 
cooperation, information-gathering and the adoption of measures consistent with 
international law to protect biodiversity in ABNJ.141  These measures are generally 
predicated upon the adoption of nationality/flag State measures.  Measures of general 
application can only be secured through multilateral agreements.142 
Some RFMOs utilize area-based management tools.  In 2006, the GFCM 
declared three areas as Fisheries Restricted Areas to protect corals, cold hydrocarbon 
seeps and seamounts.  In 2013, it adopted Resolution GFCM/37/2013/1, which seeks 
to establish and coordinate Fisheries Restricted Areas with Specially Protected Areas 
of Mediterranean Importance (SPAMIs), with a particular focus on high seas areas.143  
NEAFC has introduced closed areas in ABNJ, including Hatton and Rockall Banks, 
to bottom trawling and static gear in order to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems.144  
NAFO has established two closed areas to shrimp fisheries on the Flemish Cap.145  In 
2007, four seamount areas were closed to bottom fishing between 2007 and 2010,146 
and two further areas were closed in 2008.147  A coral protection zone was established 
in 2008, which is also closed to bottom-gear fishing.148  Following the adoption of                                                              
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conservation and management measures in 2015, there are now 13 areas closed to 
bottom fishing, six protected seamount areas, and one Coral Area Closure Zone.149  
Since 2006, SEAFO has closed a number of vulnerable marine areas to fishing.  At 
present, 11 areas are closed to all fishing and one area to all fishing except pots and 
longlines. 150   In the Indian Ocean, the Southern Indian Ocean Deepsea Fishers’ 
Association, which is comprised of the four main bottom-trawling companies in the 
region, has designated 13 Benthic Protected Areas (BPAs).  BPAs are areas where 
bottom trawling and dredging is forbidden.  However, these measures are limited to 
members; they cannot be imposed upon third-party operators.  There is also little 
independent assessment, oversight or control of the designations. 
The FAO’s International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-Sea 
Fisheries in the High Seas promote the use of area-based management in vulnerable 
marine ecosystems (VMEs).151  The Guidelines encourage both States and RFMOs to 
identify and designate VMEs.152  VMEs should be closed to fishing “until appropriate 
conservation and management measures have been established to prevent significant 
adverse impacts on VMEs and ensure long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
deep-sea fish stocks…” The Guidelines do not establish formal legal authority to 
manage fisheries.  Indeed, they note the limits of existing institutional arrangements 
and call upon States to strengthen this.153  The ABNJ IA could provide an opportunity 
to strengthen the legal basis for such measures.  That said, marine ABM principles 
tend to be discretionary and facilitative for good reason: management should be 
adaptive and context-specific.  The importance of flexibility suggests that it is 
unlikely that the prospective ABNJ IA will depart from this approach – perhaps 
preferring the exhortation of guiding principles and approaches.  The absence of 
detailed provisions on marine ABM means that the ABNJ IA is unlikely to generate 
acute legal conflicts with existing legal arrangements unless it adopts measures that 
run counter to fundamental principles of exclusive flag State jurisdiction in ABNJ. 
Herein lies the crux of the matter, as it is precisely this response to a lack of strong 
coordinated/centralized institutional management that is driving the ABNJ process. 
Detailed discussion of such issues was notably absent from the BBNJ meetings and 
PrepCom. Careful steps will need to be taken to secure the agreement on coordinated 
management within a system where the political preference is for decentralized State-
centric decision-making. 
 
Fisheries and EIA 
 
EIA is a procedural tool used in many legal systems to ensure that the potential 
adverse environmental effects of an activity are understood before a decision is made 
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to authorize it.  The duty to conduct an EIA is part of customary international law.154 
However, it is questionable whether or not this applies to existing and/or new 
fisheries.  It also unclear the extent to which fisheries should be included within an 
EIA resulting from other non-fishing activities.  The LOSC does not contain a 
specific provision requiring an EIA for fisheries; instead, it establishes under Article 
206 a rather basic requirement to consider the impacts of an activity when a State has 
reasonable grounds to believe that it may cause substantial pollution or significant 
harm to the environment.155  Article 206 falls short of requiring a cross-sectoral, 
cumulative EIA that appears to be necessary in ABNJ, although it does not 
necessarily prevent this. It also elides reference to strategic EIAs. Article 6(6) of the 
FSA requires assessment of new or exploratory fisheries, but this occurs only after the 
fishing has begun.  
Given that fishing is considered to be a significant cause of biodiversity loss, it 
is no surprise that the connection between EIAs and fisheries was raised on several 
occasions during the BBNJ and PrepCom discussions.156  In 2006, the BBNJ noted 
the potential for a new agreement to address the fragmentation and sectoral 
approaches and provide for the possibility of cumulative EIAs. 157   At the 2008 
meeting, some delegates suggested that the approach taken in UNGA Resolution 
61/105 to the assessment of impacts on fishing could be used as one model for EIA.158 
However, this suggests a non-binding commitment, and one that lacks the detail and 
structure required to undertake an effective EIA. As noted in some later debates, such 
obligations already exist under international law.159  However, the quality of such 
obligations varies considerably across different sectors, and within fisheries 
instruments they tend to be quite general or non-binding.160  In 2011, the development 
and implementation of procedures to assess the impact of activities, including 
fisheries, was proposed. 161   Thereafter, the discussion was focused on specific                                                              
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questions including: whether a new agreement would address the lack of political will 
for expanding the scope of EIA, who would conduct and monitor EIAs in ABNJ, 
whether uniform standards could be agreed, and how the cumulative impacts of 
multiple stressors from different sectors would be addressed in any EIA process.162  
Some progress on environmental assessment was made at PrepCom.  At a 
minimum, it was recognized that the LOSC provides only a general framework, and 
there is a need to develop common or minimum standards as regards the content of 
EIAs.163  The Chair’s summary of discussions simply maps out in some detail a wide 
range of features of EIAs, but without indicating how EIA will actual develop.164  
Despite the existence of a customary duty to conduct an EIA, this only 
becomes meaningful if the procedures for the EIA are then properly articulated within 
a legal instrument. As indicated in Table 1, the FSA and some RFMOs address EIA, 
albeit in quite general terms. This does not go far enough.  Elferink notes that the lack 
of EIA for fisheries is due to fisheries having developed in parallel to environmental 
law, as opposed to being part of it.165  If the prospective IA is to make a difference, 
then it will need to move beyond generalities and articulate a meaningful EIA 
process. Support for this has been emerging through non-binding instruments, and it 
is possible that the processes outlined therein may evolve into formally binding rules.  
In 2006, the UNGA called States and RFMOs to conduct EIA prior to new fisheries in 
ABNJ. Paragraph 83(a) of UNGA Resolution 61/105 calls upon RFMOs “To assess, 
on the basis of the best available scientific information, whether individual bottom 
fishing activities would have significant adverse impacts on vulnerable marine 
ecosystems, and to ensure that if it is assessed that these activities would have 
significant adverse impacts, they are managed to prevent such impacts, or not 
authorized to proceed”.  Such an EIA provides a starting point for the adoption of 
other management measures, including ABM tools for VMEs. This was reiterated in 
UNGA Resolution 64/72 of 2009, which called for implementation of UNGA 
Resolution 61/105 by flag states and RFMOs in accordance with the FAO Guidelines 
on Deep Sea Fisheries. Furthermore, they should “ensure that vessels do not engage in 
bottom fishing until such assessments have been carried out”.166  Although a positive 
development, these measures have been criticized for being too weak.167 Limited 
EIAs have been produced or they are limited to specific features, such as corals or 
seamounts. States and RFMOs have been reluctant to close areas despite these EIAs. 
Instead, management measures are often limited to encounter protocols and ‘move 
on’ rules, which are set at too high a threshold to protect VMEs.168  It is critical that                                                              
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insufficient controls have been placed on bottom trawling. If guidelines are currently 
unable to secure effective protection of valuable or important resources, then a 
stronger legally binding regime is necessary.  Although EIA is generally required of 
States, it needs to be linked to an effective decision-making process. Ideally, where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that harm may occur, an EIA must be a 
prerequisite to fishing activities taking place.  No EIA should mean no fishing.  
However, it may be observed that at the resumed Review Conference of the FSA 
2010, States adopted quite varied positions on this, with some rejecting the 
requirement of prior EIAs, 169  and others calling for a judicious use of EIAs. 170  
Underlying this is a concern about the burdens that might be placed on the fishing 
industry.  Such concerns are not unimportant, given that other, arguably wealthier 
sectors, such as commercial shipping, are not under similar pressures to conduct 
EIAs. 
It may also be observed that many fisheries are established practices and it is 
commonplace for EIA only to apply to new activities. Some RFMOs have adopted the 
requirement for prior EIA for new fisheries.  CCAMLR has led on this, requiring 
Contracting Parties to notify the Scientific Committee and submit a preliminary 
EIA.171  Contracting Parties shall not authorize vessels flying their flag to participate 
in bottom-fishing without approval of the Commission.172 Since 2014, NEAFC has 
required prior EIA of exploratory bottom-fishing in VMEs.173  This approach has 
been replicated by SEAFO.174 Exploratory bottom-fisheries in the NAFO regulatory 
area are subject to a preliminary EIA prior to authorization.175 To reiterate, such EIAs 
are limited to new and exploratory fisheries.  An exception to this is the SPRFMO.  
Since 2014, it has required that all bottom fishing activities undergo an EIA prior to 
approval. 176   Such measures do not require a new mandate under an ABNJ IA.  
However, it is arguable that they will be limited in their ability to deliver strategic or 
integrated EIA of fishing and other activities in ABNJ.  In this respect, an IA could do 
much to advance and structure the conduct of strategic EIAs (SEAs).177 
SEAs are “formalized, systematic and comprehensive processes of identifying 
and evaluating the environmental consequences of proposed policies, plans or 
programmes to ensure that they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the 
earliest possible stage of decision-making on a par with economic and social 
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considerations”.178  A SEA is usually conducted by a public authority, as opposed to 
an EIA, which is triggered and driven by a private developer/actor.  The SEA is 
intended to provide a broader framework for assessing a range of activities and may 
be better suited to integrating a wider range of factors into the EIA.  As such it can be 
used to guide individual project/activity-level EIAs and decisions.  In this sense the 
SEA and EIA are complementary and help ensure a more balanced consideration of 
public/private concerns.  However, this approach presents some difficulties when 
transposed to the international level where States are both sponsors and decision-
making authorities.  Existing instruments place the responsibility in the hands of 
individual States.179  Ideally, there should be some degree of externality to the SEA, 
otherwise the evaluation process will lack independence and legitimacy.  
Furthermore, it is arguable that individual States are not in the best position to 
conduct SEA for plans and programmes of activities that are actually set within 
regional or international bodies like RFMOs or the ISA. Here it would be logical for 
SEA to be carried within that forum or through some other cross-cutting institutional 
mechanism.  This would have the benefit of being inclusive of cumulative and inter-
related activities, and could fit within current RFMO strategic planning activities.  
Whilst this could be burdensome, and it would not remove the need for individual 
EIAs, this approach, if done carefully, could reduce the burden on individual States or 
agencies responsible for conducting project-specific EIAs.  This approach would be 
contingent on ensuring that individual EIAs take account of the SEA.   
 
Pathways to Reform of Fisheries in ABNJ 
 
Given the novelty of the topic, little has been written on the scope and content of the 
proposed IA.180 Fortunately, as the above analysis indicates, a more extensive array of 
literature exists on the governance of ABNJ, which explores regulatory/governance 
gaps, maps out governance principles, and investigates specific regulatory options, 
such as ABM and EIA. Such literature provides fertile ground for speculation as to 
the potential shape and form of an IA on ABNJ.   
Discussions at the BBNJ and PrepCom show that the challenge is not so much 
in identifying the relevant legal principles; these are well known and generally 
accepted.  The greater challenge is to overcome current institutional limitations, 
where the decentralized nature of the international legal order presents particular 
challenges for the adoption of integrated approaches and the use of spatial or cross-
cutting tools like ABM and EIA.  There is considerable scope to develop and learn 
from existing regimes.  ABM and EIA are well developed within domestic law and 
this can provide models for a legally binding instrument on ABNJ.  Domestic regimes 
are notably moving towards greater integration both within ABM and EIA regimes, 
and across different regulatory approaches.  For example, marine spatial planning at 
the domestic and regional level increasingly takes account of all activities occurring 
within marine spaces, and, at an EU level, across different jurisdictions. This is 
already influencing practices at a regional level through OSPAR and NEAFC, where                                                              
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MOUs are in place to facilitate information sharing and coordination of activities.  As 
a minimum, an ABNJ IA should encourage and structure such practices.   
Fisheries did not feature explicitly in the original list of topics to be addressed 
in an IA. However, this is not the end of the matter. If it is to succeed, a 
comprehensive, legally binding instrument on marine biological diversity must deal 
with fisheries either directly or indirectly, through the mandating of strong 
cooperative mechanisms within existing institutional regimes.  The case for the 
inclusion of fisheries is strong, given the importance States have attached to 
integrated/ecosystem-based approaches, and when considering the practical impact of 
ABM on fisheries or the need to account for the impact of fisheries when assessing 
cumulative impacts on the marine environment.  The case against the inclusion of 
fisheries largely rests on the existence of a dedicated regime for fisheries through the 
FSA and various RFMBs.  There appears to be no appetite for wholesale reform of 
RFMOs. The path of compromise is likely to see States address fisheries in ABNJ 
indirectly, through the development of principles of general application and the 
creation of more carefully structured cooperative mechanisms.  This may follow a 
similar approach to that adopted in the FSA.  Ultimately this may result in some 
moderate reform of RFMOs.  This may help address some governance gaps.  
However, it will not result in significant change in the structure and authority of 
fisheries arrangements.  This is likely to be reinforced through carefully drafted 
savings and compatibility clauses within an ABNJ IA.   
It is important not to regard the proposed ABNJ IA as a panacea and to 
overburden it with expectations.  In particular, efforts to addresses RFMO gaps in 
species and geographic coverage ought to be pursued through other fora, albeit 
influenced by discussions taking place during the UN’s ABNJ process.  Regardless of 
the direction that discussions on fisheries take at PrepCom, it is clear that 
developments will continue apace outside of the UN process.  Already during the 
debates in the BBNJ, particular emphasis was placed on UNGA Resolution 61/105, 
which addressed the impacts of bottom fishing on VMEs (including ABNJ), and the 
work of the FAO in developing international guidelines on the management of deep-
sea fisheries.181  Furthermore, since the BBNJ Working Group first met, the following 
instruments have been adopted: FAO International Guidelines on the Management of 
Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas in 2008 182  and the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of High Seas Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (I 
2009.183 The FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was adopted in 2009 and entered into 
force on 5 June 2016.184  Looking forward, there will be ongoing consideration of 
issues related to ABNJ during the Review Conferences of the FSA and at the 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the CBD.  At a 
regional level, conservation and management measures taken by RFMOs will 
continue to adapt to the complex socio-ecological realities of ABNJ.  These fora and 
initiatives provide fertile grounds for cross-fertilization of ideas and approaches.  
Over the next couple of years they will inevitably influence the way in which fisheries 
issues are handled during PrepCom and the subsequent ABNJ IA negotiations. 
 
                                                             
181 See UNGA Resolution 61/105, paras 82-90. 
182 Supra (n 151). 
183 Supra (n 114). 
184 Available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1644t.pdf.  
